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I N V I T E D  E D I T O R I A L
What equity market participant could ever forget the month of October 1987? It was a wild, turbulent time, and Monday, October 19 was a black day: the Dow 
Jones Average of 30 industrial stocks dropped 508 points 
on that day to close down 22.61%. But the dramatic plunge 
on the 19th is not what captures our attention in this piece. 
Rather, we are drawn to the sharp market swings of more 
than a quarter of a century ago, and the fact that, to the 
current day, bouts of sharply accentuated, short-period 
volatility continue to characterize our equity market.1 
How might we deal with such turbulence?
Our answer: get the listed companies involved in 
providing liquidity for their own shares. On October 19, 
more than 604 million shares of NYSE-listed stocks traded. 
Although this number was enormous relative to the New 
York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE) 1987 average daily trading 
volume of 189 million shares, it was only roughly 1% of the 
total number of shares outstanding.2 This very small per-
centage suggests that a corporation could relatively easily 
bring meaningful liquidity to the market for its stock.
October 1987 was fraught with major economic 
uncertainties: concern about a federal budget deficit, a 
trade deficit, rising interest rates, a threat of renewed inf la-
tion and, as the market opened on October 19, news that an 
Iranian oil platform in the Persian Gulf had been bombed 
by warships thought to be American. But the precipitous 
decline on October 19 was not attributable to fundamentals 
alone. In response to the falling market, portfolio insur-
ance programs had kicked in, driving prices into virtual 
free fall as orders and quotes disappeared on the buyers’ 
side of the market.
John Phelan, then CEO of the NYSE, recognized 
that the October 19 plunge was in good part a technical 
event driven by the portfolio insurance programs. To reas-
sure investors and to stem a further decline, Phelan stepped 
forward. On October 20, he and his chief lieutenants at the 
exchange hit the telephones, asking CEOs and other top 
brass at the listed companies to buy back their own shares. 
His efforts were successful. According to a report by the 
SEC’s Division of Market Regulation, close to 600 firms 
announced open-market repurchase programs during the 
two weeks following the crash.3 With this corporate sup-
port, the market regained normality.4
And so a powerful idea was pushed to the fore: get the 
listed companies involved in providing liquidity for their 
own shares. Phelan, however, was not the first to think 
of involving listed companies in the quest for improved 
market quality. Recognizing the accentuated range over 
which share prices can f luctuate, in their classic book, 
Graham and Dodd [1934] wrote:
“It follows that the responsibility of managements to 
act in the interest of their shareholders includes the 
obligation to prevent—in so far as they are able—the 
establishment of either absurdly high or unduly low 
prices for their securities.”
Let us further consider the need to get listed com-
panies involved.
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THE NEED TO ENHANCE MARKET LIQUIDITY 
AND QUALITY OF PRICE DISCOVERY
As the f lash crash on May 6, 2010, dramatically 
underscored, markets are prone to unwarranted instability. 
Virtually every day, intra-day price volatility is elevated.5 
Unsurprisingly, on both sides of the Atlantic regulators are 
giving a good deal of attention to proposals for improving 
market liquidity and the quality of price discovery.
These proposals include imposing a special fee on 
trading, requiring that unexecuted orders remain posted 
for a minimum resting time, and attracting a larger portion 
of market-maker capital, either by granting dealers subsi-
dies or by giving them additional perks. Will regulatory 
approaches such as these accomplish their desired objec-
tive? Each of them has been criticized, and we wonder if 
regulators are looking in the right direction.
To answer this question, it is important to recog-
nize that 1) insufficient liquidity provision and the com-
plexity of price discovery cause accentuated volatility; 
2) our continuously trading markets achieve imperfect 
liquidity and price discovery through orders placed by 
public limit-order traders, by traditional market-makers, 
and by high-frequency traders (HFT), a more recent breed 
of participants who also have a market-maker role; 3) in 
addition to the participants in the individual trades, a wide 
spectrum of investors is affected by intra-day volatility and 
the attending complexity of price discovery.
For the most part, regulatory proposals have focused 
on controlling the limit-order traders, dealers, and HFT 
participants. However, these proposals fail to take into 
account an important reality: in acting out of their own 
self-interests, none of these participants is incented to do 
whatever is best for the market as a whole. Why? Because 
price determination in the equity markets is a public good, 
precisely because investors who are not trade participants 
care about and are affected by the prices that trades estab-
lish. Market prices are used to mark positions to market, 
as well as in derivative trading, estate valuations, mutual 
fund valuations, dark pool pricing, and by corporations 
assessing their costs of capital.
Economists recognize that free markets undersupply 
public goods. We should not try to overcome this reality 
by imposing cumbersome carrot and stick rules on stan-
dard market participants. Sound public policy should 
honor the fact that not one of them—not the limit order 
placers, nor the standard market makers, nor the new HFT 
players—is incented to supply adequate amounts of the 
public good. Why should they? But if these participants are 
not so incented, who is? The listed companies themselves, 
as we will explain shortly. First, we consider the role of 
traditional market makers.
TRADITIONAL MARKET MAKERS
The standard view in the microstructure literature is 
that market makers are suppliers, not of liquidity per se, but 
of immediacy, while the “naturals” provide liquidity itself. 
That is, public buyers supply liquidity to public sellers (and 
vice versa). This is most understandable. Market makers 
certainly need to keep their share inventories in reasonable 
balance, and no market maker can continue to buy shares 
from public participants who are looking to sell without 
re-liquefying by selling shares to other public participants 
who are looking to buy (and vice versa). In this context, 
the bid–ask spread is the market maker’s compensation for 
providing immediacy to public participants.
However, inadequate immediacy provision is not 
the problem that regulators are addressing (and, in any 
event, immediacy for large-cap stocks is largely provided 
by limit orders that public participants place in the book). 
From a public policy perspective, the problem is the price 
turbulence that occurs when the book becomes unduly 
sparse. Controlling this turbulence calls for providing 
supplemental liquidity.
A market maker’s economic function has historically 
extended beyond providing immediacy. The NYSE spe-
cialists of old were responsible for making fair and orderly 
markets, and both specialists and Nasdaq market makers 
have played key price discovery roles. In today’s turbulent 
environment, it is not surprising that regulators would 
look to traditional market makers for answers. However, 
it is unrealistic to expect traditional market makers to 
apply their capital with an unprofitable intensity, and it 
is important to recognize that the public goods benefits 
that enhanced liquidity and price discovery bestow on the 
broader community are not monetized for market makers. 
With this in mind, we turn to a market maker-type role 
that a listed company can play.
LISTED COMPANIES
Some may not think that a listed company’s func-
tions extend to serving as a market maker. An automaker, 
for instance, is in the business of producing cars, not 
making the market for its stock. But this understanding is 
unduly limited. A company should be involved, for it is 
better positioned than a traditional market maker, limit-
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order trader, or HFT participant to internalize the public 
goods benefits that attend deeper liquidity provision and 
enhanced price discovery. This is because a corporation 
seeks not to realize profits from trading per se, but to 
maximize the value of its shares. To the extent that poor 
price discovery and turbulent price changes have negative 
consequences for the broader array of market participants, 
the value of a company’s shares can be impaired, raising 
its cost of capital.
Because the markets for small- and medium-sized 
companies are generally less liquid than those for blue 
chips, we expect that smaller companies in particular 
would benefit from instituting stabilization programs. 
Moreover, because they typically have lower free f loat, 
smaller companies are more prone to being gamed with 
relatively less money. We also suggest that the more widely 
corporate liquidity-provided stabilization programs are 
used, the more effective they will collectively be in tem-
pering broad market swings that include stocks of all cap 
sizes.
Precedents exist for companies having meaningful 
associations with market makers for their stocks. Histori-
cally, NYSE specialists have maintained contacts with the 
management of the companies whose shares had been 
allocated to them. Currently, in five European countries 
(France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Portugal) 
sell-side intermediaries called “designated sponsors” con-
tract with the listed companies (generally one or two to a 
company) to enter orders that, by reducing spreads, make 
the markets for the companies’ shares more liquid.6 And 
corporations have historically bought back their own 
shares, not simply because they feel the price is right from 
an investment prospective, but also to stabilize their share 
values when they believe a short-run price decrease is not 
justified.
Schwartz [1988] and more recently Alan et al. [2015] 
have set forth a specific procedure by which a listed com-
pany could more directly provide supplemental liquidity 
for its shares. The proposal calls for a company to estab-
lish a fund run by a third-party fiduciary to buy back the 
company’s shares in a falling market and sell its shares in a 
rising market. Importantly, the procedure would be totally 
transparent, with all parameters announced well in advance 
and the companies committing to the program for a pre-
specified, adequately long period of time.
When it comes to a listed company taking a more 
direct role in making a market for its own shares, a primary 
concern is the possibility that the firm will manipulate 
its share price. Alan et al. [2015] address this issue (along 
with the more general problem of gaming). They argue 
that the defense against manipulation (and gaming) lies in 
the high degree of transparency that their procedure calls 
for, along with requiring that all relevant parameters be 
pre-announced and that a third-party intermediary, such 
as a designated sponsor, play an important fiduciary and 
advisory role. Moreover, the transparent presence of the 
large corporate orders would make it more difficult for 
other participants to manipulate the market.
Any specif ic plan to have a listed company bring 
supplemental liquidity to the market would unquestionably 
require further thought and analysis. Nevertheless, one 
reality is clear: for the public goods benefits that additional 
liquidity would provide to be more fully realized, the listed 
companies must be involved.
ENDNOTES
1Following Black Monday in 1987, the market reversed 
direction on October 20 and 21, with the Dow regaining 289 
points to end the day 16.03% higher than its October 19 close. 
October 26 saw another big drop (156.83 points or 8.04%), 






3See Division of Market Regulation [1988].
4Eventually, many firms did not actually carry the pro-
grams out, as discussed by Netter and Mitchell [1989].
5For further discussion, see Alan and Schwartz [2013].
6In practice, designated sponsors have supplied liquidity 
for the less liquid small-cap and mid-cap stocks, not for blue-
chip stocks.
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